Attacker Deterrence And Perceived Risk In A Stackelberg Security Game Pdf

attacker deterrence and perceived risk in a stackelberg security game pdf

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I study optimal contracting in a model in which a principal hires an agent in order to experiment on a project of unknown quality. The principal provides the resources needed for experimentation and at each moment the agent has the choice between working or keeping the benefits for himself.

Intelligent adversary risk analysis: a bioterrorism risk management model.

Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composed of cyber, physical and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple layers and units of modern control systems require an integrated framework to address cross-layer design issues related to security and resilience challenges. To this end, game theory provides a bottom-up modeling paradigm to capture the strategic interactions among multiple components of the complex system and enables a holistic view to understand and design cyber-physical-human control systems. In this review, we first provide a multi-layer perspective toward increasingly complex and integrated control systems and then introduce several variants of dynamic games for modeling different layers of control systems. We present game-theoretic methods for understanding the fundamental tradeoffs of robustness, security and resilience and developing a cross-layer approach to enhance the system performance in various adversarial environments. This review also includes three quintessential research problems that represent three research directions where dynamic game approaches can bridge between multiple research areas and make significant contributions to the design of modern control systems. The paper is concluded with a discussion on emerging areas of research that crosscut dynamic games and control systems.

Publications by authors named "Richard S John"

We show how quantifiable deterrence effectiveness and resulting critical infrastructure risk change when we obfuscate notional Port Security Grant investment information from a prospective attacker, and we also explore whether these metrics change if we assume Prospect Theory is a more accurate explanation of decision making than classical Subjective Expected Utility Theory. Importantly, we do not advocate for policy changes but rather expand on a previously published methodology that might support such decisions in the future. Taquechel, Eric F. The goal of this article is to illustrate a process to support decisions on whether to publicize information about CIKR security investments intended to deter attacks, or whether to obfuscate those investments, by considering cognitive biases. Importantly, we are not advocating for publicizing or obfuscating details of federal grant investments in general. We simply offer a methodology to support such decisions. To set the context for this proposed process, we claim that the notion that people make completely rational, fully informed decisions is debatable.

The proliferation of terrorism worldwide raises the risk that terrorist strategies could evolve from conventional methods e. The authors make three contributions toward a better understanding of this risk and how it responds to counterterrorism measures. The authors find that in equilibrium, CBRN attacks, though less likely and more difficult to execute, are more deadly. In the end, the trade-off between, on one hand, the greater difficulty of carrying out a CBRN attack, and on the other, the greater deadliness of such an attack, points to a level of optimal counterterrorism spending by governments that weighs toward defending against CBRN attacks. The authors discuss these results and compare them with the actual level of counterterrorism spending by the US Government. The framework of the game allows for substitution between the conventional and CBRN weapon types.

Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: In Stackelberg security games, a defender must allocate scarce resources to defend against a potential attacker. The optimal defense involves the randomization of scarce security resources, yet how attackers perceive the risk given randomized defense is not well understood.

Decision and Game Theory for Security

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The 16 revised full papers presented together with 5 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions. Game and decision theory has emerged as a valuable systematic framework with powerful analytical tools in dealing with the intricacies involved in making sound and sensible security decisions. Combined with our classical approach to computer and network security, and drawing from various fields such as economic, social and behavioural sciences, game and decision theory is playing a fundamental role in the development of the pillars of the "science of security". Skip to main content Skip to table of contents.

У тебя ужасный вид. Сьюзан подавила поднимающуюся волну страха. В нескольких метрах от нее ярко светился экран Хейла. - Со мной… все в порядке, - выдавила .

 - И назвал это победой в борьбе за личные права граждан всего мира. Ты должна признать, Сьюзан, что этот черный ход был придуман для того, чтобы ввести мир в заблуждение и преспокойно читать электронную почту.

Панк сплюнул в проход, явно раздраженный невежеством собеседника. - Табу Иуда. Самый великий панк со времен Злого Сида.

Дэвид улыбнулся: - Да. Наверное, Испания напомнила мне о том, что по-настоящему важно. - Помогать вскрывать шифры? - Она чмокнула его в щеку.  - Как бы там ни было, ты поможешь мне с моей рукописью. - Рукописью.

Собрав все силы, Хейл, сильнее обхватив Сьюзан за талию, начал пятясь подниматься по лестнице. Она пыталась цепляться каблуками за ступеньки, чтобы помешать ему, но все было бесполезно.

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Gabriel P.

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Vedette A.

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Request PDF | Attacker Deterrence and Perceived Risk in a Stackelberg Security Game | In Stackelberg security games, a defender must.

Laubalquica

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In Stackelberg security games, a defender must allocate scarce resources to defend against a potential attacker. The optimal defense involves.

Carter A.

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In our experiment, attackers' decisions are in the context of a Stackel- berg security game, which could differ from standard risk experiments where subjects select.

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